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Abstract
This paper develops a two-country general equilibrium model to
examine the welfare eect of tari-tax reforms that x the world price.
We show that this reform improves welfare if an origin tax is adjusted,
but that it reduces welfare if a destination tax is used. Moreover,
this result is reversed in the export tax case. In short, whether the
proposed policy reform improves welfare depends on which between
imports and exports are taxed as well as tax principles.
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1 Introduction
World trade has considerably grown since the end of World War II. As stan-
dard international economics tells, trade liberalization benets the world as
well as an individual country. However, there is still resistance to trade lib-
eralization for a variety of reasons. One reason is that trade liberalization
alone does not necessarily ensure a welfare improvement in the presence of
other market distortions, e.g. domestic taxes.1 Then, a natural question
arises; what sort of tari-tax reform is welfare-improving?
To this question, Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart
(2002) provide a clear answer. Assuming a competitive small open economy,
they show that a tari reduction accompanied by a point-by-point increase in
destination tax improves welfare. Although this result is useful in the sense
that the proposed policy is practically easy to implement, it can not apply
to a large country that inuences the world price.
In order to complement the above literature, this paper seeks a tari-tax
reform that necessarily leads to a welfare improvement in a two-country gen-
eral equilibrium model. Concretely, we consider tari reductions combined
with an adjustment of a domestic tax that x the world price by allowing for
two tax principles: a destination-based tax and an origin-based tax. There
are two reasons for focusing on the world-price-xing tari-tax reform. For
one thing, this reform is shown to freeze foreign welfare, which avoids for-
eign retaliation. Besides, this property allows us to easily determine whether
the proposed reform improves world welfare just by looking at the eect on
domestic welfare. For another thing, this reform has a practical advantage
that it targets an observable variable. While one can theoretically consider
a welfare-xing policy, such a policy is impossible to implement since it is
based on an unobservable variable, welfare. The policy prescription we pro-
1Another reason is that trade liberalization decreases the government revenue. This
is serious particularly for low-income countries since the government of these countries
largely depends on trade tax revenue as IMF (2005) reports.
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pose overcomes this diculty.2 As we will establish, whether this reform
improves welfare depends on (i) tax principles and (ii) which between im-
ports and exports are taxed. For example, in the case of import taris,
the above reform raises (resp. lowers) domestic welfare if the origin (resp.
destination) tax is used.
There is a large literature on tari-tax reforms.3 As mentioned earlier,
Hatzipanayotou et al. (1994) and Keen and Ligthart (2002) show that one
unit of tari reduction and one unit of destination-based tax increase improve
welfare of a small open country. Kreickemeier and Raimondos-Mller (2008)
nd that the same reform can worsen market access dened by a value of
imports evaluated at the world prices. While these papers assume an import
tari, Emran (2005) shows that a point-by-point reduction in export tax and
increase in origin tax is welfare-improving. Taking into account an informal
sector, Emran and Stiglitz (2005) demonstrate that a revenue-neutral tari
reduction combined with an increase in destination tax may worsen welfare.4
Although we assume away an informal sector, we show that an appropriately-
designed tari-tax reform is still useful.
This paper proceeds as follows. Sections 2 and 3 examine the welfare
eects of the world-price-xing tari-tax reforms under the destination and
origin taxes, respectively. Section 4 concludes.
2For these reasons, the world-price-xing policy has been studied in the literature on
multilateral and regional trade agreements. Vanek (1965), Ohyama (1972) and Kemp and
Wan (1976) apply this idea to Pareto-improving customs unions. Bagwell and Staiger
(1999, 2002) are a pioneering work in the literature on multilateral trade agreements.
3Neither the literature on the reform of trade policy only nor the literature on the
multilateral tax reform is reviewed since both issues are beyond the scope of this paper.
See Woodland (1982), Dixit (1985), Neary (1998), and Falvey and Kreickemeier (2011) for
these elds.
4As to the negative evaluation of the tari-tax reform of Emran and Stiglitz (2005),
Keen (2008, p. 1894) claims that `the results of Emran and Stiglitz (2005) are much less
damaging to conventional advice than they may appear.
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2 Destination Tax
2.1 Model
Suppose a perfectly competitive two-country (Home and Foreign), two-good
(Goods 1 and 2) general equilibrium model with an asterisk representing a
Foreign variable. The Home government levies a trade tax t and a destination-
based tax  on Good 1. All taxes are assumed to take a specic (per-unit)
form.5 Thus, the consumer price and the producer price are p + t +  and
p+ t, respectively, where p is the world price of Good 1 in terms of Good 2.
Good 2 (numeraire) is untaxed, following the existing literature, e.g. Keen
and Ligthart (2002). If Foreign observes laissez-faire, the trading equilibrium
is characterized by:
e(p+ t+ ; u) = r(p+ t) + ep(p+ t+ ; u) + t[ep(p+ t+ ; u)  rp(p+ t)]
(1)
e(p; u) = r(p) (2)
ep(p+ t+ ; u) + e

p(p; u
) = rp(p+ t) + rp(p); (3)
where u and u are utility of Home and Foreign, e() and e() are an expen-
diture function, r() and r() are a GDP function, and subscript p stands
for a partial derivative with respect to the price. All the functions are as-
sumed to satisfy the standard properties.6 Eq. (1) is an expenditure-income
equality of Home, where ep() and t[ep()  rp()] represent revenue from the
destination tax and the trade tax, respectively. Eq. (2) is a counterpart of
Foreign, and (3) is a world market-clearing condition of Good 1. This system
determines u; u and p, given t and  .
To see the eects of a change in two taxes, let us totally dierentiate the
5If t is positive and Home imports (resp. exports) Good 1, it represents an import
tari (resp. export subsidy).
6See Dixit and Norman (1980), Woodland (1982), Wong (1995), and Feenstra (2003).
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above system:264 eu   ( + t)epu 0 ep   rp   epp   t(epp   rpp)0 eu ep   rp
epu e

pu epp + e

pp   rpp   rpp
375
264 dudu
dp
375
=
264 ( + t)epp0
 epp
375 d +
264 epp + t(epp   rpp)0
 (epp   rpp)
375 dt; (4)
where subscripts u and u refer to a partial derivative with respect to u and
u, respectively.
2.2 Welfare Eect
We now address the welfare eect of a tari-tax reform. As stressed in
Introduction, we assume an integrated policy reform consisting of a tari
reduction and an adjustment of  that xes the world price. Since a change
in p is given by dp = (@p=@t)dt + (@p=@)d , the proposed reform requires
that
d =   @p=@t
@p=@
dt =  euepp   (eu   epu)rpp
euepp
dt; (5)
by setting dp = 0. At this stage, we make an assumption, which dates back
to Hatta (1977a, b):7
Assumption (Hatta Normality Condition) eu   epu > 0.
Eq. (5) has three notable properties. First, as is evident from Eq. (2),
this reform xes Foreign welfare, and hence we can easily determine the eect
on world welfare just by looking at the eect on Home welfare. Second, the
destination tax must be raised in response to the tari reduction, i.e., d > 0.
7By linear homogeneity of the expenditure function, this condition is alternatively
expressed as eu   epu = (p + t)epu + e2u > 0, where e2u  @2e()=@u@p2. Thus, this
condition requires that the producer-price-evaluated expenditure increases in utility.
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Third, noting that (5) is rewritten as
d =
266664 1+(eu   epu)rppeuepp| {z }
( )
377775 dt;
we have jd j > jdtj. That is, when a tari is reduced, domestic consumption
must be over-taxed so as to keep the world price constant.
In order to interpret the last two properties of the reform, recall that
tari reductions have a `dual' eect; tari reductions are equivalent to si-
multaneous reductions in destination tax and origin subsidy. However, by
assumption, the destination tax is the only domestic policy available to the
Home government. Therefore, the Home government has to over-tax domes-
tic consumption so as to oset the `dual' eect of tari reductions.
Substituting (5) into the right-hand side of (4) yields
 euepp   (eu   epu)rpp
euepp
264 ( + t)epp0
 epp
375 dt+
264 epp + t(epp   rpp)0
rpp   epp
375 dt
=
rpp
eu
264 eu   ( + t)epu0
epu
375 dt:
The rest of our task is to replace the right-hand side of (4) with the above
vector, and compute the comparative statics outcomes. Through some ma-
nipulations, we can establish:
Proposition 1 A coordinated reduction in import taris and an increase in
destination-based taxes reduce welfare of Home and the world.
Proof. By applying Cramer's rule, the eect of the proposed reform on
Home welfare becomes
dujdp=0 =
rpp
eu
dt; (6)
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which leads to signfdug = signf  dtg. In other words, if the initial desti-
nation tax is positive ( > 0) and a tari is reduced (dt < 0), Home welfare
falls (du < 0). jj
Assuming the simplest case where t;  and ep   rp are positive, we now
explain the intuition behind Proposition 1. As Proposition 1 of Ederington
(2001, p. 1585) suggests, the world eciency requires both  and t to be
zero. Relating this result to our context, world welfare rises when the policy
reform involves a simultaneous reduction in trade and domestic taxes. Then,
the world gains from the reform by approaching the rst-best equilibrium.
However, this does not hold in the present case because the world-price-xing
requirement results in an increase in the destination tax. This is the reason
for welfare losses in (6).
While Proposition 1 concerns the import tari case, it readily applies to
the export tax case in which both t and ep   rp are negative. Given the
fact that `over 100 countries apply export taxes,' (Solleder, 2012, p. 1) it is
worthwhile to address the export tax case. Then, an export tax reduction is
represented by dt > 0, thereby arriving at d < 0 (consumption tax decrease)
and dujdp=0 > 0 from (5) and (6). This result is stated as:
Corollary 1 A coordinated reduction in export taxes and a decrease in
destination-based taxes raise welfare of Home and the world.
That is, the world-price-xing reform is a good policy prescription if ini-
tially exports and domestic consumption are taxed. More broadly, Proposi-
tion 1 and Corollary 1 suggest that replacing an import tari and/or export
subsidy (resp. import subsidy and/or export tax) with a destination subsidy
(resp. destination tax) ensures welfare gains of the world.
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3 Origin Tax
3.1 Model
This section turns to the case of destination-based taxes. Since the derivation
of the main results is substantially the same as that of the previous section,
we briey outline the core argument. The trading equilibrium is described
by
e(p+ t; u) = r(p+ t  s) + srp(p+ t  s) + t[ep(p+ t; u)  rp(p+ t  s)]
(7)
e(p; u) = r(p) (8)
ep(p+ t; u) + e

p(p) = rp(p+ t  s) + rp(p); (9)
by replacing the destination tax  with an origin tax s.
The totally-dierentiated system of the above equations is264 eu   tepu 0 ep   rp   srpp   t(epp   rpp)0 eu ep   rp
epu e

pu epp + e

pp   rpp   rpp
375
264 dudu
dp
375
=
264 ( s+ t)rpp0
 rpp
375 ds+
264 srpp + t(epp   rpp)0
 (epp   rpp)
375 dt; (10)
which serves as a basis for our analysis.
The world-price-xing reform is now dened. Noting dp = (@p=@s)ds +
(@p=@t)dt and using (10), our requirement becomes
ds =  @p=@t
@p=@s
dt =
(eu   sepu)rpp   euepp
(eu   sepu)rpp dt
=
2666641  euepp(eu   sepu)rpp| {z }
(+)
377775 dt; (11)
by setting dp = 0. As in the destination tax case, we assume a Hatta Nor-
mality Condition:
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Assumption (Hatta Normality Condition). eu   sepu > 0.
Eq. (11) has three key properties that are mentioned in the last section.
First, this reform xes Foreign welfare. Second, the origin tax must fall
(ds < 0) as a result of a tari reduction (dt < 0). Third, when a tari is cut,
the origin tax must be over-reduced to freeze the world price. The reason is
as follows. Tari reductions have the `dual' eect in the sense that a tari
reduction is equivalent to a simultaneous reduction in a destination tax and
an origin subsidy. However, the origin tax alone is available by assumption,
and so the Home government ends up over-cutting the origin tax in order to
oset the eect of initial tari reduction.
3.2 Welfare Eect
We now identify the tari-tax reform in (11) on Home welfare. When ds in
the right-hand side of (10) is replaced by (11), the right-hand side of (10)
becomes
rpp(eu   sepu)  euepp
rpp(eu   sepu)
264 ( s+ t)rpp0
 rpp
375 dt+
264 srpp + t(epp   rpp)0
 (epp   rpp)
375 dt
=
sepp
eu   sepu
264 eu   tepu0
epu
375 dt:
Straightforward manipulations yield
Proposition 2 A coordinated reduction in import taris and a decrease in
origin-based production taxes raise welfare of Home and the world.
Proof. Making a comparative statics exercise, we have
dujdp=0 =
sepp
eu   sepudt: (12)
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Since the coecient of dt < 0 is negative, we have signfdug =  signfs dtg.
Thus, if domestic production is initially taxed (s > 0), a reduction in the
Home tari (dt < 0) raises Home welfare (du > 0). jj
It suces to provide the intuition of Proposition 2 briey because it is
almost the same as that of Proposition 1. As mentioned earlier, whether the
proposed reform improves welfare depends on whether both the trade and
domestic taxes approach zero. If the origin tax is employed, this requirement
is satised, i.e., both the import tari and the origin tax fall. As a result,
the proposed reform benets the world as well as Home.
Once we get Proposition 2, it easily applies to the export tax case in which
t is negative and its reduction is expressed by dt > 0. Then, we obtain:
Corollary 2 A coordinated reduction in export taxes and an increase in
origin-based production taxes reduce welfare of Home and the world.
It follows from our ndings that the welfare eects of the world-price-
xing tari-tax reform depend on (i) which between imports and exports are
taxed and (ii) tax principles. This is shown in Table 1.8
(Table 1 around here)
Remark. As stated in Footnote 1, tari-tax reforms are an attractive
policy guidance particularly for low-income countries that heavily depend
on trade tax revenue. However, we have discussed no scal implication of
the reform. This is not because the scal aspect is unimportant but just
because the eect on government revenue is ambiguous. This is made clear
by dening government revenue G as follows.
destination tax case : G  ep(p+ t+ ; u) + t [ep(p+ t+ ; u)  rp(p+ t)]
8One can extend our results to the case of subsidies by properly changing the sign of
t;  and s.
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origin tax case : G  srp(p+ t  s) + t [ep(p+ t; u)  rp(p+ t  s)] :
Totally dierentiating these denitions, the change in G is decomposed as
destination tax case : dG = epd| {z }
(+)
+ dep| {z }
( )
+(ep   rp)dt| {z }
( )
+ td(ep   rp)| {z }
0
origin tax case : dG = rpds| {z }
( )
+ sdrp| {z }
(+)
+(ep   rp)dt| {z }
( )
+ td(ep   rp)| {z }
0
:
Accordingly, the revenue eects can be both positive and negative.
4 Conclusion
We have studied world-price-xing tari-tax reforms in a two-country general
equilibrium model. It is shown that tari reductions are welfare-improving
(resp. reducing) if an origin (resp. destination) tax is adjusted to keep the
world price unchanged. This superiority of origin tax over destination tax
is reversed in the case of export taxes. In the existing literature, `in the
competitive case, the principle by which taxes are levied is thus irrelevant
to the eciency case for their harmonization' (Keen et al., 2002, p. 1560)
However, our results clearly suggest that this statement is no longer true of
the context of tari-tax reforms.9
Despite the above novelty, a number of open questions are left. First,
we have assumed that Foreign observes laissez-faire by following the existing
literature on tari-tax reforms. It is of great importance to explore multilat-
eral reforms within our context and framework. Second, we have employed
a two-country, two-good model for convenience, but it is interesting to check
the validity of our results in higher dimensions. Third, we have used a static
model of perfect competition, which calls for more elaborations. For ex-
ample, Keen and Lahiri (1998), Keen et al. (2002), Hauer and Puger
(2004), Keen and Ligthart (2005), Hauer et al. (2005) and Naito and Abe
9This dierence in evaluation comes from that they consider tax harmonization while
we examine tari-tax reforms.
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(2008) consider imperfect competition, and public goods are allowed in Abe
(1992, 1995) and Lahiri and Raimondos-Mller (1998).10 Furthermore, Naito
(2006a, 2006b) takes into account a dynamic eect of reforms in a model of
endogenous growth. Our study is just a reference point, and extensions and
generalizations to these richer frameworks are important research agenda.
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Destination Tax Origin Tax
Import Tari   +
Export Tax +  
Table 1: Welfare eects of the reform: the row represents the domestic tax
base, and the column represents which between imports and exports is taxed.
In the table, `+' (resp. ` ') means a welfare improvement (resp. deteriora-
tion) as a result of the world-price-xing policy reform.
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